1991

Twenty years ago, I saw the best defense of my lifetime. In 1991, the Philadelphia Eagles led the NFL in rushing, passing, and overall defense. Despite having one of the worst offenses I’ve ever watched, the Eagles won 10 games on the strength of that defense. This post was supposed to celebrate the season the defense had that year. Instead, I’ve found that I can’t discuss them without going into detail about the offense. Overall, I think it reads as an indictment of that offense, which is, in fact, an indictment of Buddy Ryan’s offensive talent evaluation and Rich Kotite’s coaching.


Eagle fans had high expectations for 1991. Sure, they had fired Buddy Ryan, but he hadn’t won a playoff game anyway. No one really knew much about Rich Kotite, but he had been hired as the offensive coordinator prior to the previous season, and the result was Randall Cunningham becoming, as Sports Illustrated would call him, The Ultimate Weapon. Randall threw for 3,400 yards with 30 touchdowns against only 13 interceptions while also collecting 942 rushing yards. That was in his first season in a new offensive system. And, because Mike Quick’s career ended only 9 receptions into 1990, the Eagles’ starting wide receivers that season were Fred Barnett and Calvin Williams, both of whom were rookies. It was only going to get better, thought everyone in Philly. 4,000 yards passing with 40 touchdowns and 1,000 rushing by the quarterback was not out of the question. Then Bryce Paup happened. On the first play of the second quarter of Rich Kotite’s first game as a head coach, Paup hit Randall just as he released the ball and tore the quarterback’s ACL (17 years later, Bernard Pollard would hit Tom Brady in the exact same fashion and become the catalyst for an NFL rule change). I remember playing Lakers vs. Celtics with my friend Mike during halftime of the Eagles-Packers game when we heard the news over the radio that Randall was out for the season. We thought the Eagles were done. We ALL thought they were headed for 3-13. Sure, the same players from Buddy’s defense were still there, but neither Ryan nor his coordinator, Jeff Fisher, was around anymore. Bud Carson, the fired Browns head coach, ran the defense in 1991. Who knew that unit could get better?

Because of their superiority in the secondary, I rate the 1991 Eagles defense above the 1985 Bears and 2000 Ravens, in that order. Neither of those other defenses was handicapped by poor offense as much as the Eagles were—to fully appreciate how great the 1991 Eagles defense was, you have to understand exactly how bad the offense was. I know what you’re thinking: the 2000 Ravens offense went 5 consecutive games without scoring a touchdown, so there’s no way the Philadelphia offense was worse. Au contraire mon frère. The Ravens actually scored very well compared to the Eagles. 5 consecutive games without a touchdown, but Baltimore scored nearly 21 points per game in 2000; the 1991 Eagles scored just shy of 18 per game. 3 points per game difference may not seem like a lot, but look at it this way: since 1979, only three 10-win teams have scored fewer points than the 10-6 Eagles of 1991.

That Philly offense was pitiful. It had already been pitiful, but Randall Cunningham masked it. A few weeks ago on Twitter, someone noticed that the Eagles’ leading rusher in 1991 only gained 440 yards. That’s bad, but that statistic alone doesn’t give the entire picture. It doesn’t tell you that the Eagles played 1991 without their man who had been their leading rusher for years. Randall Cunningham was the Eagle running game. Look at this:

• In 1986, Buddy Ryan’s first season as head coach, Randall played all 16 games while starting only 5, yet only trailed the team rushing leader by 37 yards. Randall had 540 yards and 5 rushing touchdowns. Keith Byars led the team with 577 on 3.3 yards per carry. Also, Cunningham was the only Eagle with more than 1 rushing touchdown that season.
  
• In 1987, as the full-time starter, Randall led the Eagles in rushing. He had 505 yards while Anthony Toney finished second with 473 on 3.7 yards per carry.
  
• In 1988, as the full-time starter, Randall led the Eagles in rushing. He had 624 yards while Keith Byars finished second with 517 on 3.4 yards per carry.
  
• In 1989, as the full-time starter, Randall led the Eagles in rushing. He had 621 yards while Anthony Toney finished second with 582 on 3.4 yards per carry.
  
• In 1990, as the full-time starter, Randall led the Eagles in rushing. He had 942 yards while Heath Sherman finished second with 685 on 4.2 yards per carry.

If we look at the entire Buddy Ryan-Rich Kotite era, which stretches from 1986 to 1994, there was only one season, 1992, in which an Eagle other than Randall Cunningham ran for more than 750 yards. That season, Herschel Walker gained 1070 yards on the ground, and the Eagles, not so coincidentally, won their only playoff game during that timeframe.

The lack of running game in Philly was a disgrace, and the 1991 season illustrates how bad it was without Randall’s contributions. In the 28-team NFL, the Eagles had the 13th most rushing attempts, but ranked only 21st in rushing yards. Unsurprisingly, they finished 20th in rushing first downs. It should come as no shock to you that the 1991 Eagles were dead last in yards per rush. Since 1980, only 7 teams were worse than the 1991 Eagles’ 3.13 yards per carry average. Four of those teams had top ten passing offenses quarterbacked by the likes of Drew Brees and Dan Marino; the other 3 were at the bottom of the NFL in points scored (2 of those 3 are the 1999 and 2000 San Diego Chargers, who drafted LaDainian Tomlinson in 2001). Point is, the Eagles were a historically bad rushing team. Because of Randall Cunningham, the Eagles 2nd in the NFL in rushing yards, rushing first downs, and yards per carry in 1990.

What a difference one man made between 1990 and 1991, and we haven’t even discussed the Eagles’ passing game yet. The 1990 Eagles, quarterbacked by Cunningham, were 13th out of the league’s 28 teams in passes thrown. For their efforts, they finished 7th in passing yards & first downs and 2nd in touchdown passes. In 1991, those ranks fell to 20th, 27th, and 12th, respectively, while attempting the 7th most passes in the league. Overall, the Eagles fell from 3rd in points scored to 18th and 8th in yards per play to 25th. Randall Cunningham may not have been anywhere near the quarterback as Peyton Manning was, but his absence had a nearly identical effect on the team’s offense.

A team having the 13th most rushing attempts in the league and finishing 21st in yards sounds really, really bad, but it also sounds almost somewhat plausible. Finishing 20th in passing yards while throwing the 7th most passes is unfathomable to me. How does that happen? These statistics are an condemnation of the quarterback play.

I know your first question: who was the Eagles’ backup quarterback? The answer is: 32-year old Jim McMahon. McMahon wasn’t completely awful—he was serviceable, just a little bit below average—but he was brittle even as a young pro. There was no way he was going to survive as a 15-game starter in his 30s. Coming into 1991, McMahon had only three times played as many as 10 games in a season, but he actually turned in one of his healthier seasons that year. He started eleven games and finished six of them (some unfinished due to benchings). All told, McMahon was responsible for only 60.6% of the Eagles’ 513 pass attempts that season. His numbers won’t wow you (60.1% completions, 12 TDs, 11 INTs, 80.3 rating), but he was infinitely better than the guys who backed him up.

Jeff Kemp threw the second-most passes for Philly in 1991. Kemp actually began that season as he had the previous four, serving as Dave Kreig’s backup in Seattle. Kemp played in 7 games, starting 5, as a Seahawk. In his final two games with Seattle, Kemp started and went a combined 26-56 for 351 yards, 1 touchdown, and 6 interceptions. He was released a few hours after that last start. Two weeks later, he made his Eagles debut after the 49ers knocked out McMahon. Jack Kemp, the quarterback’s father and member of George Bush’s Cabinet, was Eagle owner Norman Braman’s guest that day. I soon felt sorry for the old man. Jeff Kemp’s stat line for that game reads 1 incomplete pass and 1 rush for 7 yards. What you can’t see from the box score is that the 7-yard scramble ended with Kemp sandwiched between two defensive linemen. Kemp fell to the ground face down and stayed there. No movement at all, not even a twitch. I thought he was dead. Jack was pale as a ghost. Jeff was out cold. That’s the first time I can remember seeing a player’s facemask removed with his helmet left in place.

Kemp came back 5 weeks later and played in four more games, starting two of them. His stat line as an Eagle: 57-114, 546 yards, 5 TDs, 5 INTs, 60.1 rating. At 32 years old, Jeff Kemp retired at the end of the season.

The archaic Pat Ryan (any Jet fans older than 30 are probably vomiting at reading his name) played in four games. He only threw 26 passes, but that was enough to complete 4 to the other team and post a 10.3 rating. He threw, by the way, zero touchdown passes.

Brad Goebel, the man I consider the face of the 1991 Eagles offense, started two of the 5 games he played. Those two starts resulted in 23 combined first downs, 375 yards of total offense, 10 turnovers, and not a single offensive touchdown. Goebel finished that season with 6 interceptions. He only threw 3 passes the rest of his career, which ended without a touchdown pass.

If you were keeping track, you noticed that Eagle quarterbacks combined to throw 17 touchdown passes against 26 interceptions (27 if you include the pick thrown by Keith Byars). Their rating for the season was 63.2. Ouch.

Overall, the Eagles turned the ball over 43 times in 1991. 43 turnovers. 43 turnovers. In one season. 16 games. 43 turnovers. And they went 10-6. In the early 1990s NFC East. 10-6. With 43 turnovers.


It’s difficult to explain how handicapped this defense was to someone who did not see them play. The best way I can do it is to take a look at the 6 games the Eagles lost in 1991. First was Week 2 at home against Phoenix. The Eagles allowed 80 yards on the ground, but it took the Cardinals 33 carries to gain them. The leading rusher picked up 54 yards on 19 carries. And Tom Tupa only completed 6 passes on the day. Still, the Eagles lost 26-10 (the touchdown came 2 plays after Seth Joyner picked off a pass, returned it to Phoenix’s 5-yard line, got up, and shoved the ball into Jim McMahon’s gut while telling him, “Score.”). The Eagles offense turned the ball over 6 times that day, one of which was a fumble returned for a Cardinal touchdown.

The defense responded by shutting out the Cowboys in Texas Stadium. A few weeks later, they played in RFK on Monday Night Football. The Redskins were still undefeated. It was the defense’s worst performance of the year. They allowed 184 yards through the air and 173 on the ground (41 carries), although they did force 4 turnovers. But it’s hard to offer any type of resistance without any rest. The offense only managed 4 first downs and 89 total yards. 35 passing yards. 4 first downs. In an entire game. Pitiful. It was a performance that makes LSU’s offensive performance against Alabama look less pathetic.

The next Sunday, the Eagles went to Tampa to play an 0-5 Buccaneers team that finished 3-13. This is the most memorable Eagles game from my high school years. Of all the games I wish I had on DVD, this is at the top of the list. The Eagles held the Bucs to only 12 first downs and 193 total yards. They also forced 6 turnovers. And, yes, the Buccaneers won. How? Rich Kotite.

The game in Tampa was Brad Goebel’s first career start. He was facing a Buccaneer defense that would finish the season ranked 5th in passing but only 25 in rushing—you can probably attribute much of that to the fact that the offense stunk and, therefore, the Bucs were trailing throughout just about every game—so Kotite went into the game refusing to let Goebel lose it for him. The Eagles just ran and ran and ran. They ran so much they gained 117 yards on the ground. On 41 carries. 2.85 yards per carry. And that includes a reverse to Kenny Jackson and 2 carries by the punter. The Eagles’ true ground game (running backs and quarterback) picked up an even hundred yards on 38 carries (2.63). That’s just ugly. The big guy that day was Heath Sherman, who gained 89 yards on his 35 carries (2.54). Kotite did let Goebel throw it 20 times; those passes resulted in 62 yards and 2 interceptions.

Check out these nuggets from Paul Domowitch’s game story in the next day’s Philadelphia Daily News:

• “They’ve got the type of running game that you can shut down,” said [Jesse] Solomon, whose unit held the Eagles to 117 mostly insignificant yards on 41 carries in the Bucs’ 14-13 come-from-behind victory. “They’re not very sophisticated. They’re not going to do a lot that’s going to pull you away from what you know.”
  
• “I’ve played against Philadelphia on a number of occasions and they’ve never really had a strong offensive line that they felt confident with,” Solomon said. “Today was further evidence of that.”

Yes, that was a linebacker from a 1-5 team talking.

In The Philadelphia Inquirer, Bill Lyon wrote the following:

• The Eagles’ failure to run with any degree of success, whether it is the fault of the offensive line or because the lack of backs with acceleration, has been well-chronicled. It didn’t change yesterday.
  
• On the sole occasion the Eagles’ offense actually generated its own momentum, it drove 47 yards. Unfortunately, it needed 48. On first and goal at the Tampa Bay 3, Sherman was stopped for no gain, with the defense massed in the middle, simply waiting for him. Keith Byars was flagged for illegal motion on the play, and the Eagles tried again from the 8. They tried, to no one’s surprise, Sherman. He got 2 yards. Plus a ringing in his ears that wouldn’t go away. They tried him again. He got 2 more. Plus a contusion, a welt and a limp. The Eagles called time. They conferred. Trick play? No, Sherman again. For 3 more, to the 1.

As you see, the Eagles were unable to move the ball against Tampa Bay. And they were unable to score an offensive touchdown against the 25th ranked team in scoring defense. They were able to score a pair of field goals, though. And Seth Joyner recovered a fumble for a touchdown. Philly led 13-0 heading into the 4th quarter. Then Kotite grew even more conservative. Goebel only threw 1 pass, which fell incomplete. Other than that, it was 12 Heath Sherman runs, and you already know how they turned out. To quote Lyon’s colleague, Mark Bowden, “With rookie Brad Goebel at quarterback yesterday, the offense looked like a porcelain stork, afraid to move for fear it might break.”

Kotite, Kotite, Kotite. This is what the head coach had to say about his conservative attack: “I was running Sherman up the middle and off tackle; I was alternating, mixing it up that way. What I was trying to do was burn the clock and punt it.” That’s such a losing mentality. And it backfired when punter Jeff Feagles dropped a snap and gave the Bucs possession at the Eagles’ 7 (this went as a -12-yard run for Feagles; he’d previously successfully run a fake punt for 11).

Tampa converted that into a touchdown as they did the short field after the ensuing 3 & out by the Philly offense. 14-13 was the final score. In the Washington and Tampa Bay games, the offense gained a total of 89 passing yards.

Bowden: “As a unit, the defense had done all it could and more: intercepted three passes, scored a touchdown, sacked Tampa Bay quarterbacks three times for 24 yards, forced four fumbles and recovered three.” Those guys were not happy with their coach. Seth Joyner said, “How do you play like that?” Jerome Brown called it, “the worse I’ve ever felt.” Bowden’s game story closed with this: “‘It hurts,’ said [Wes] Hopkins, who contributed six tackles, two sacks, an interception, a forced fumble and two recovered fumbles. ‘Hell, I don’t know if we can do any more. We’re gonna try.’”

You would think the Eagle offense would have come out the next week and put some points on the board. Against the 6-0 NFC West-leading Saints, they did not. They ran the ball better than they did in Tampa (53 yards on 17 carries, 3.12 average), but Goebel and Pat Ryan threw 5 interceptions. The defense was brilliant again (2.1 yards allowed per rush, 40% completions, 162 total yards allowed, 2 turnovers forced), but the offense just couldn’t score. This time they lost 13-6.

The loss to the Saints stretched the losing streak to 3 games. The defense’s totals for those three games are: 39 first downs allowed, 712 yards allowed, 415 yards passing, 297 yards rushing, 12 turnovers forced, and 50 points allowed. For the offense: 27 first downs gained, 464 yards gained, 240 yards passing, 224 yards rushing, 13 turnovers given up, 19 points scored. The closest comparison I can come up with is Randy Johnson’s 1999 season, which featured a 4-game stretch during which he went 0-4 with a 1.41 ERA and his team’s offense totaled 0 runs and 6 hits.

The following week was the aforementioned 49ers game. What I did not tell you earlier was that Jeff Kemp’s 7-yard rush was the Eagles’ longest run of the game. As team, they gained 29 yards on 14 carries. They also turned the ball over 5 times. But they did score an offensive touchdown, a feat they’d not accomplished during the previous 3 games. But they didn’t put any other points on the board. The defense held Jerry Rice to 2 receptions for 4 yards, Steve Young to 96 yards in the air, and held the 49ers running game to less than 3.5 yards per carry. But it still wasn’t enough. In the Lehigh Valley Morning Call, Terry Larimer wrote, “The Eagles, who have now lost four straight games, used pretty much the same formula for failure as they have in the past—no running game, no pass protection, too many mistakes, too many penalties and too many broken bodies at quarterback.”

Jim McMahon came back early from his injury to start that game. He was knocked out, but returned after Kemp was concussed. Regarding the 29 yards the Eagles earned on the ground, Larimer wrote, “eight of which were contributed by a pair of quarterbacks—one of whom got carried off on a stretcher and the other who probably shouldn’t have played in the first place and certainly shouldn’t have come back to play again in the second place.”

It didn’t matter who played quarterback, the offense was just pitiful. Also from Larimer’s game story: “[Rod] Harris bobbled a pair of punts, including a controversial one that nearly ended in a San Francisco TD, while [Keith] Jackson foolishly tried to lateral to Byars after one of his catches and instead coughed up a fumble. Asked what he thought of that play, Kotite said, ‘I didn’t see it. I didn’t have my glasses on.’” Since Kotite once lost his play chart on a rainy day because he forgot to laminate it, I wholeheartedly believe that explanation.

The loss to the 49ers was the 3rd consecutive game that no Eagle running back had a carry that went for 10 or more yards and the 6th in a row in which no back had a carry go for more than 12 yards. That’s unreal.

At that point in the season, the defense started playing even better and led the team to a 6-game winning streak that ended when Dallas visited the Vet for a matchup of 9-5 teams. The winner was going to make the playoffs; the loser would be out. Dallas’ first points came on a safety. Their winning points came on a Kelvin Martin punt return for a touchdown. Once again, the Eagle defense balled out. The Cowboys rushed for less than 2.5 yards per carry and Steve Beuerlein completed only 9 of 31 passes. And yet, the Eagles offense couldn’t do better.

So yeah, that great defense won 10 games with that offense. The numbers are amazing. 3,549 yards, 3.9 yards per play, 206 first downs (133 in the air, 56 on the ground), 206 completions, 2,413 passing yards, 6.0 yards per pass, 44.1% completions, 52.1 passer rating, 55 sacks, 1,136 rushing yards, 4 rushing touchdowns, 3.0 yards per rush, 48 turnovers. Every single one of those led the NFL. The Eagles picked off 26 passes, which was good for third in the league. And they gave up only 244 points (15.2 per game), 5th in the league, despite that poor, turnover-prone offense.

Not once all season did an opposing offense tally 20 first downs in a game. 10 times in 16 games they held their opponent for less than 200 yards passing and 85 yards rushing. They gave up 300 yards of total offense exactly one time, at eventual Super Bowl champion Washington.

They could blanket you in coverage and they were impenetrable versus the run. What had been missing in previous seasons had been a second cornerback to play alongside Eric Allen. Prior to 1990, that guy had been someone we used to call “I Smell” Izell “Stinkin’” Jenkins (if you ever see highlights of Joe Montana’s comeback at the Vet in 1989, it’s Jenkins’ #46 that you see chasing John Taylor and Jerry Rice into the end zone). In the first round of the 1990 draft, most thought the Eagles were going to draft Georgia running back Rodney Hampton. Instead, they chose his teammate, cornerback Ben Smith. Smith was very good as a rookie and played outstandingly in 1991. Unfortunately, he suffered a non-contact injury on the painted dirt in Cleveland and was never the same again. Eric Allen is, in my opinion, a Hall of Fame cornerback. What a great, great player.

Both outside linebackers were versatile: strong against the run, excellent blitzers, and could smother an opposing tight end. Seth Joyner is, along with Wilber Marshall and Derrick Brooks, one of the three best 4-3 outside linebackers I’ve ever seen. In 1991, he was unreal. 6.5 sacks, 3 interceptions, 6 forced fumbles, 4 fumble recoveries, and 2 touchdowns were his numbers, but they don’t tell the whole story. He was an enforcer. On a team with Reggie White, Clyde Simmons, Jerome Brown, Wes Hopkins, and Andre Waters, Seth may have been the most feared defender. William Thomas was just a rookie and wasn’t inserted into the starting lineup until midway through the season. But he was fast and proved to be an above average defender in pass coverage and a great blitzer.

The man in the middle was Byron Evans. B & E wasn’t spectacular and he wasn’t quite on the level of Mike Singletary. But he made all the calls and held down the middle. Most importantly, he didn’t miss tackles. He was the one the men on the defense saw as the leader.

The front four. Far and away the best four-man line I’ve ever seen (my football memories begin in 1982). Reggie. Clyde. Jerome. Mike Pitts is the forgotten man, but he was also a beast. Mike Golic and Andy Harmon also took reps as tackles. How good were they? You don’t always see defensive linemen near the top of a tackling leaderboard, but Simmons, White, and Pitts all had 100 or more tackles in 1991. The 4 starting linemen totaled 39 sacks. That never happens.

Often, you see great defenses have their best seasons after a collective realization that their offense wasn’t going to be able to help them. You know about the Ravens. The 1985 Bears played with the memory of being shut out in the 1984 playoffs by the 49ers, who taunted them with, “Bring your offense next time.” The Giants’ best defensive season came a year after they were shut out in the playoffs. In 1991, the Eagles defense rallied around Cunningham’s injury and knew that winning football games was going to be their responsibility.

What they did that season was both awe-inspiring and unprecedented. Nobody before or since was that good against the run and the pass. I don’t just mean finishing best in the league in both categories—the Eagles were historically great in both. Since I started watching football in 1982, only four defenses held quarterbacks to a lower passer rating than the 1991 Eagles’ 52.1: the 1985 (7th in the NFL) and 1986 Bears (2nd), 1988 Vikings (7th), and 2002 Buccaneers (8th). All of them allowed at least 3.4 yards per carry. Since the NFL-AFL merger, only four defenses have held opposing teams to fewer than the 1991 Eagles’ 2.97 yards per carry: the 1998 Chargers (3rd in the NFL), 2000 (3rd) and 2007 Ravens (24th), and 2006 Vikings (5th). None of them had a defensive passer rating below 62.5. Overall, the Eagles allowed 3.922 yards per play. Since the passing rules changed in 1978, that number has only been bested by the 1979 Bucs (3.891) and 2008 Steelers (3.896). They were also historically great at forcing turnovers. They forced 48 that year, tied for the league lead with New Orleans. In the years since, only the 2000 Ravens have surpassed that number (Baltimore force 49), and only the 2007 Chargers have tied it. These numbers are unbelievable, especially considering they were posted by one team.

You’ve already seen the statistics, but what do they mean? The measure of the defense’s greatness is that they won 10 games against a schedule that was not at all easy. The Eagles’ 1991 opponents had a combined 129-127 record. That may not seem all that tough to you, but look at year-by-year NFL schedules. Most playoff teams don’t play a schedule that strong. 7 of the 16 games were against teams with 10 or more wins on the season. They went 3-4 in those games, allowing 112 total points. 1991 was also year 6 in a decade-long period during which the NFC East won the Super Bowl 7 times (it was also year 2 of a four-in-a-row stretch). As such, there were 6 games against teams that were within a season of winning the Super Bowl (keep in mind this is the pre-free agency era when rosters did not change drastically from season to season). They went 4-2 in those games (91 total points allowed).

The offense’s 1991 performance was criminal. That defense should have been in the playoffs. The season they had was special. Despite their offense, the Eagles went 3-4 against 10-win teams and 3-3 against playoff teams. That shows how great they were. But instead of shining in January, their destiny is to be forgotten by all but the die-hards.

The End of an Era

It is currently 7:04am on January 1, 2012. As I wait for my wife to wake up, I am sitting in my living room eating a bowl of oatmeal, drinking a cup of tea, and watching the Cowboys @ Giants game from January 1994. The NFL Network labels it “Emmitt’s Gutsiest Game”. You know the one—Emmitt Smith separated his right shoulder near the end of the first half, yet he remained in the game and carried Dallas to an overtime victory in the regular season finale. It is a similar situation to the game that will take place tonight: Cowboys at Giants, winner wins the NFC East. The stakes of that 1994 game were significantly higher—the winner would earn home field advantage throughout the NFC playoffs and the loser would have to go to San Francisco in the second round—but what strikes me more right now is that the game marked the end of an era.

Only two weeks earlier, CBS lost its NFC broadcast rights to Fox. January 2, 1994 marked the last CBS broadcast of a regular season NFL Game until 1998. Back then, though, CBS meant the NFC. The network has never really recovered from that lost. Football still isn’t right on Fox, and the AFC just doesn’t carry the same cachet for CBS now that the NFC did back then.

Due to conflicting egos, this game was also the last regular season game for Jimmy Johnson as head coach of the Cowboys. Special circumstances are required for a coach to get fired weeks after winning a championship. Even Paul Westhead kept his job with the Lakers for more than a year after winning the NBA title. We may never see anything play out like the Jimmy and Jerry saga ever again.

Lawrence Taylor. Phil Simms. This was the final regular season game in the careers of both legendary Giants. No two players symbolize the Bill Parcells era in New York like those two. They are just two of the players who made the NFC East what it was.

Speaking of my favorite division, this game, which appropriately went to overtime, was the last great moment of the old NFC East. Sure, Dallas went on a win a Super Bowl a couple of years later under Barry Switzer, but the rest of the division wasn’t the same. 1993 was the last year that the entire division (I mean, who really considered the Cardinals part of the division?) were contenders.

This game was the perfect end to the era. It was close, hard-hitting, and legendary. And it was called by John Madden and Pat Summerall.

Rematch

1990. This season’s LSU and Alabama football teams remind me of that year. Twenty-one years ago, the Giants and 49ers were the NFL’s superpowers. Like the LSU and Alabama teams that will meet in the Superdome on January 9, the Giants and 49ers were defensive juggernauts. And like the Tigers and Crimson Tide, New York and San Francisco played a highly anticipated regular season game that many thought was a dud (in both cases, I found the games to be among the best regular season football games I’ve ever seen). Once the LSU-Alabama rematch became official, I started thinking about the 1990 Giants-49ers games. I can’t get them out of my head, so I figured I’d just go ahead and revisit.

By mid-October 1990 it was apparent that the Giants and 49ers were the class of the league. Both teams remained undefeated and football fans looked forward to November 25th, the Monday after Thanksgiving, and the prospect of a pair of 11-0 teams facing off against each other. The two teams had won 3 of the previous 4 Super Bowls—the 49ers were two-time defending champions looking to become the first team to win 3 consecutive Lombardi Trophies.

8 days before they played each other, both teams’ undefeated runs ended against division rivals. The 10-0 Giants were blown out in Philly (this was the game that featured Keith Byars’ block on Pepper Johnson, the greatest block in NFL history); the 49ers lost by double digits to the Rams in Candlestick (I’ve always found it interesting that through his first 2 seasons as head coach, George Seifert’s 49ers were 15-5 at home and 16-0 on the road). It’s easy to say that both teams were looking ahead, but that would be false. The Rams had been the 49ers’ opponent in the previous season’s NFC Championship Game and the Eagles had taken 4 of the previous 5 against New York. Those two rivalries have been vicious for over 50 years; the Giants and 49ers were just flat-out beaten.

Still, the anticipation for 10-1 Giants at 10-1 49ers was high. I was 13 back then and didn’t watch much Monday Night Football because I had a hard time staying up until 1:00 in the morning. I made sure I stayed up for this one, though. I knew it was going to be hard-hitting and low-scoring. Those defenses were the best and most consistent of my childhood—yes, even more so than Chicago’s—and neither team gave up a lot of points. Including the postseason, only twice that season had San Francisco allowed more than 21 points; the Giants only gave up that much once. I was looking forward to one of those games that my dad told me he remembered from his childhood. I hoped it would live up to the hype. Man, what a game. The 49ers won 7-3, and the game ended with the Giants failing to score a touchdown from a goal-to-go situation.

I went to school the next day looking forward to talking about how great the game was. When I got there, all I heard was how boring the game was. I was so disappointed. When I got home from school, I turned on WIP because I needed to hear somebody who had enjoyed the game. Howard Eskin came on the air and said the game proved to him that the Giants and 49ers were the two best teams in the NFL. Caller after caller told him he was an idiot. I turned off the radio.

That disappointment is similar to what I felt in the aftermath of the LSU-Alabama game in November. I thought the game was great, the best regular season college game I’d seen since the 7-3 Auburn-LSU game from 2006. People at work, on Twitter, and in the media expressed the opposite viewpoint. Even though I’m not a college football rematch fan, I started looking forward to the possibility of an LSU-Alabama national championship game.

Back in 1990, I started looking forward to a Giants-49ers rematch in the NFC Championship Game. I didn’t think anyone else in the NFC could beat either team in a playoff game. Then a crazy game occurred on a Saturday afternoon in Jersey. The Bills came in to play the Giants in a game so physical that both teams lost their starting quarterbacks. Buffalo lost Jim Kelly for the rest of the regular season; the Giants lost Phil Simms for the regular season and playoffs.

I didn’t think Jeff Hostetler would be good enough to get the job done, but he was. The Giants won the NFC East and Hostetler only had to throw 17 passes as his team destroyed the Bears in their first playoff game. The 49ers easily disposed of the Redskins in theirs. The rematch was set.

I went on the internet and looked up defensive statistics for the 1990 NFL season. I found that the Giants and 49ers ranked second and third, respectively, in yards allowed that year. They were also the two least scored upon defenses in the league. New York allowed 13.2 points a game while San Francisco gave up 14.9 (how perfect was it that their rematch ended in a 15-13 Giants victory?).

The NFC Championship Game. Man, that game was everything. And everybody. Madden and Summerall. Rice, Montana, and Craig. Parcells and Belichick. Millen, Haley, Turner, and Burt. LT, Pepper, and Reasons. Ronnie Lott versus Mark Bavaro. And Candlestick Park. The only thing missing was Brent Musberger’s patented “You are looking live…”

The winner would play the Bills (these are the first-time Super Bowl participant Bills, not the punch line Bills who played the Cowboys in later years), but nobody cared. It had been seven years since the AFC had won a Super Bowl and, though we didn’t know it at the time, it would be another seven years before that streak was broken. In the Parcells era, the Giants had never allowed more than 21 points in a playoff game. The 49ers had not allowed a touchdown in their previous 3 NFC Championship Game appearances. This game, Giants at 49ers, was going to be a war. It was the real Super Bowl. At least, that’s how I saw it.

Today, more than 20 years removed from the game, I believe it is the most physical, hard-hitting football game I’ve ever seen, more physical, even, than the Bucs-Rams championship game of January 2000 and the Steelers-Ravens championship game of January 2009. There was some vicious hitting going on out there. Both starting quarterbacks were knocked out the game. Hostetler managed to come back in. 23 months went by before Joe Montana played again.

The game also turned out to be the best football game I’ve ever seen. I can watch that game over and over and over again, and I have. I’ve seen it at least a dozen times, and I never get tired of it. The Giants and 49ers of 1990 were two aging teams making what both knew would be their respective cores’ last Super Bowl run. Rumor of Parcells’ (first) retirement were swirling. Bill Belichick was going to get a head coaching job. Lawrence Taylor was about to turn 32. In San Francisco, it was about to be Steve Young’s time. Ronnie Lott was leaving. Both teams were getting old, but they were still the best. And this game was the last time the old rivals were going to go at it. This was their Thrilla in Manilla. This was the Giants and 49ers’ fight for the championship of each other. They took the glory and splendor of the November game and created something so much grander, so much more intense. To those men, that game was everything. That game epitomizes football to me.

When I look at LSU and Alabama, I see the same thing. Take a look at the LSU schedule and the Alabama schedule for 2011. LSU only gave up 10 or more points six times this season, never more than 27. The Crimson Tide game up 10 points five times with a maximum of 21 points allowed. All told, LSU and Alabama have the two best defenses in the country. Alabama ranks first in the nation in each of the following: yards allowed per game, rushing yards allowed per game, passing yards allowed per game, and points allowed per game. LSU ranks second, third, eight, and second, respectively, in those same categories. Between the two defenses, they allow a combined 19.3 points per game. And both teams represent a conference that will win its 6th consecutive national championship. Yeah, I’m really looking forward to January 9th. I want to see these two teams play with more intensity than they did on November 5th. I want to see the Tigers and Tide bring each other to a higher level. I expect they will. Why shouldn’t I?

Maybe it’s just wishful thinking. Sometimes, though, wishes do come true.

Can't See the Forest...

Most of the time I either agree with what I read from the Cold Hard Football Facts or feel convinced enough to at least consider what they write. What they, specifically Kerry J. Byrne, posted on cnnsi.com yesterday struck out with me. (I should also add that something this morning on their own website actually angered me. In this post about the “scrambling quarterback double standard”, Patrick Imig complained about ESPN’s Monday Night Football preview show guys not complaining about a late out of bounds hit on Tim Tebow in overtime on Sunday. I saw the replay at least a dozen times. Tebow was not hit out of bounds. It was proper that no personal foul was called. Sure, he was headed out of bounds, but his right foot was on the ground in bounds. I wish more officials avoided calling late hits on quarterbacks when no foot has yet landed out of bounds. Donovan McNabb stole many yards and caused many penalty flags exploiting this throughout his career.)

Anyway, the conclusion of Byrne’s post was that the Broncos are 5-1 with Tebow starting because he has outplayed the opposing quarterback in each of the 5 victories. To quote Byrne: “Put most simply, Tebow consistently outplays the other team’s quarterback, often by wide margines. This superior play is the No. 1 reason for Denver’s sudden success….But these superior performances seem lost on even the most knowledgeable football minds, like that of Broncos executive and Hall of Fame quarterback John Elway, for example.” Um…what??? By technical definition, you can say that Tebow’s play has been superior to that of the opposing quarterbacks. In technical definition only. Colloquially, however, the use of the word superior is inappropriate here. Tebow’s quarterback play has been far below average, especially considering that the Broncos have scored a total of 4 offensive touchdowns in their last 3 games.

Let’s look at the Broncos’ 5-1 stretch more closely. They have played, in order, Miami, Detroit, Oakland, Kansas City, New York Jets, and San Diego. Those teams currently rank 27, 15, 8, 10, 16, and 7, respectively, most points allowed in the NFL this season. Against those defenses, the Broncos have averaged 19.3 points per game. Considering that Eddie Royal returned a punt for a touchdown in Oakland and Andre Goodman returned an interception for a touchdown versus the Jets, the Broncos’ offense has averaged exactly 17 points per game during Tebow’s 6 starts. The 38 points (31 by the offense) against the Raiders vastly skews those numbers. Eliminating that game and the one loss to Detroit, the Broncos other 4 Tebow-led victories featured a total of 68 points (61 by the offense) for an average of 17 (15.25) points per contest. The Broncos have totaled four offensive touchdowns in their most recent three games, versus the Chiefs, Jets, and Chargers. And I’m only now mentioning that from the 3rd quarter of the game in Oakland through the 3rd quarter the next Sunday in Kansas City, Tebow went 62 minutes of game time without throwing a completed pass. The Broncos scored 34 points during that stretch. It is borderline offensive to use the word “superior” to describe the quarterback play during this stretch.

One might hypothesize that the Broncos’ low scoring is due to their heavy running and spread option offensive attack leading to long, time-consuming drives that drain the clock. One would be incorrect. Only the Rams, Seahawks, and Jaguars have punted more often in 2011 than have the Broncos. Bronco punter Britton Colquitt ranks fourth and fifth, respectively, in net punt average and punts inside the opponents’ 20. And Tebow’s 6 starts represent Colquitt’s 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 8th heaviest punting loads of the season. Only once in Tebow’s starts have the Broncos punted less than 7 times; they never punted that much in a game started by Kyle Orton.

It is fact, though, that Tebow’s performances have been better than his opponents’. That does not imply that Tebow has played well. He has not. The other quarterbacks have played worse. The Broncos defense has completely shut down the last three starting quarterbacks: Matt Cassel, Mark Sanchez, and Philip Rivers. While none of these 3 quarterbacks is having a good statistical year, the Bronco defense held each of them to an even lower level than their personal season average. During the current 4-game winning streak, no quarterback has achieved as high as an 80 passer rating. Carson Palmer’s 79.7 is the highest rating of the 4. Cassel’s 66.5 rating is 10.1 lower than his season rating, Sanchez’s 67.9 is 13.0 lower than his season rating, and Rivers’ 77.1 is 3.7 below his season rating. So, yes, Tebow has outplayed his opponents’ quaterbacks. He’s done it by sucking less. The man deserves credit for that, not praise. How can anyone look at those opposing passer ratings compared to each quarterback’s season rating and write, “This superior play is the No. 1 reason for Denver’s sudden success”? As far as I’m concerned, that statement ignores the clear, obvious, and definitive answer.

Tebow’s success is due to his abilities to take hits while running the ball constantly and to avoid turnovers. His ability to lead Denver’s offense to punts gives the defense some cushion. And, yes, he’s led some great drives at the ends of games, but he has not played well. He has not scored points. As I wrote on Twitter earlier this week, the Broncos scored 20 or more points in 4 of Kyle Orton’s 5 starts while only reaching that mark once in Tim Tebow’s 6 starts. Don’t tell me the quarterback is the reason for the victories. It’s nonsense. And it is dismissive of the defense and the running game, the latter of which happens to lead the NFL at over 150 yards per game. (And if you want to know why the defense has suddenly begun playing better, look at the pass rushers. Von Miller is a rookie; Elvis Dumervil is a veteran who missed all of 2010 and 2 games earlier this season. The lockout prevented OTAs and real training camp, and it took these guys some time to get rolling. Also throw in the brand new coaching staff, including on the defensive side of the ball, and the slow start retroactively seems both logical and inevitable.) Defense, defense, defense with a huge dose of the running game. The Broncos have become Les Miles’ LSU Tigers for the second half of this season. It’s clear, it’s obvious, and there really should be no debate.

Stream of Thoughts on the NFL

The other day, Cold Hard Football Facts made a post defending Eli’s claim that he was on the same level as Tom Brady. They weren’t arguing that Eli is at the same level as Brady, but rather that he led both the greatest upset and greatest championship drive in NFL history and, therefore, needs to take a back seat to no one. After reading that column, I felt the need to go back and rewatch the 4th quarter of Super Bowl XLIII because I thought both Kurt Warner and Ben Roethlisberger had led pretty great drives themselves. Let me tell you: both of them are amazing to watch in real-time, especially Roethlisberger’s game-winner. Thinking about those drives got me thinking about other things, too. Here’s how my thought process went:

• During my rewatch, I got to see Larry Fitzgerald’s long touchdown catch-and-run that put the Cardinals ahead. I remember watching the game live and seeing James Harrison run with every ounce of energy he had to try and catch Fitzgerald until Troy Polamalu ran over to him and tapped his shoulder. “Give it up, man. They got us,” was the message in that tap. Every time I rewatch that play, that tap is what sticks with me. That play, if you really think about it, embodies everything that four players personified during their careers. The perfect placement of the pass by Warner that led Fitzgerald into the opening of the defense; Fitzgerald’s great hands and perfect route, and perfect stride; the relentless pursuit of James Harrison; and Polamalu putting himself in awful defensive position by jumping to the outside and leaving the middle open, then coming back and trying to make a play, and finally taking care of his teammate. Great, great play. It’s the most memorable play from that Super Bowl to me, and yes I remember Harrison and Santonio Holmes’ touchdowns.
  
  
• On the television broadcast, John Madden remarked how the game was in the Steelers defense’s hands and they failed to come through. When the Steelers came back to win, people commented how Roethlisberger was actually a part of that Super Bowl team. There is a myth out there that he rode the defense’s coattails to the 2005 championship. That’s false. Roethlisberger had a historically bad Super Bowl, but look at the rest of that playoff run. The Steelers offense passed in the first half to get leads and then ran the ball in the second half kill the clock. People are letting the horrible Super Bowl XL he played cloud their memories of the other 3 playoff games Pittsburgh played that year. Roethlisberger threw 2 touchdown passes in the first half of each of those other 3 games and totaled 7 TDs and 1 INT total. His quarterback rating in those games were 148.7, 95.3, and 124.9, respectively. One dreadful game does not equal riding the defense’s coattails during a playoff run.
  
  
• The moment when Polamalu tapped Harrison’s shoulder reminds me of a similar moment that took place a year earlier. After Randy Moss caught the touchdown that put the Patriots up 14-10 in the Super Bowl against the Giants, Tedy Bruschi and Junior Seau hugged on the sidelines. Those two moments were the exact opposite of each other. Whereas the Steelers’ moment was consoling, this was triumphant. Ironic how the Steelers came back to win and the Patriots’ defense let the game slip through their fingers.
  
  
• Speaking of slipping through fingers, have any good players ever had worst Super Bowl 4th quarters than Asante Samuel and Rodney Harrison did against the Giants? Harrison, of course, couldn’t get the ball off of David Tyree’s helmet. The Giants’ first touchdown drive began with Kevin Boss beating Harrison for a 45-yard gain. Samuel, you remember, failed to intercept a pass that went through his hands on the play before the helmet catch. Earlier in the quarter, a few plays after Boss’ big gain, David Tyree caught a touchdown pass when Samuel was too slow to react to him in the end zone.
  
  
• He wasn’t a good player, but Anthony Dorsett had a pretty bad play in a Super Bowl 4th quarter when he misplayed a ball in the air. That turned into Kurt Warner’s 73-yard game-winning touchdown pass to Isaac Bruce. Of course, the Raiders signed Dorsett to a free agent contract that offseason. He repaid them by misplaying a pass over the middle to Shannon Sharpe that the tight end turned into the longest touchdown pass in NFL playoff history.
  
  
• Isaac Bruce’s touchdown overshadows two of the greatest drives in history. Everyone remembers the nearly 90-yard drive that ended with Kevin Dyson at the Rams’ 1-yard line. Earlier in that half, though, the Titans were on the verge of getting blown out. The Rams had just scored to make the score 16-0, and my father and I were wondering if we were about to witness the first shutout in Super Bowl history. The Titans then marched on to the first of what would be consecutive 7+ minute scoring drives that would help them tie the game. The first one was a beauty, though, encompassing everything the Steve McNair-era Titans were all about. Only three men—other than the center—touched the ball during that drive: McNair, Eddie George, and Frank Wycheck. It was a 12-play, 66 yard touchdown drive that made the score 16-6, and the only play that went longer than 9 yards was a McNair run that went for 23. You don’t see teams trailing by double digits in the second half commit to running the football, but the Titans did, and they came all the way back to tie the game. It was a great drive, and we’ll probably never see another one like it in a Super Bowl situation again.
  
  
• I don’t think people realize how great Mike Jones’ tackle of Kevin Dyson on the game’s final play really was. Watch it again. Jones wasn’t supposed to be able to make that play. He must have seen Dyson from the extreme limit of his peripheral vision. It is, without hyperbole, the most important tackle in Super Bowl history.
  
  
• And all this makes me think about how lucky football fans in their mid-20s and younger are. When I was growing up, the Super Bowl was always an awful game. From the time I was 6 years old through my freshman year in college, the Super Bowl scores were as follows: 38-9, 36-16, 46-10, 39-20, 42-10, 20-16, 55-10, 20-19, 37-24 (24-0 midway through the 3rd), 52-17, 30-13, and 49-26. From Super Bowl XXX on, they’ve been pretty good, and people who grew up watching these games are very fortunate. Look at the scores from the last 16 Super Bowls: 27-17 (Steelers trailed by 3 and had ball at midfield with a few minutes left), 35-21, 31-24, 34-19, 23-16, 34-7, 20-17, 48-24, 32-29, 24-21, 21-10, 29-17 (Chicago trailed and had the ball nearing midfield in the 4th), 17-14, 27-23, 31-17, and 31-25. That’s a pretty good run of Super Bowls.

McNabb & Favre? Not for My Playoff Team

Over the years, I have watched a lot of football. One thing that I have noticed is that with very rare exception, NFL quarterbacks only have a short stretch of championship football in him. Quarterbacks can play at a high level for a long time, but there seems to be a very short time span during which they actually play at a championship level in the playoffs. During my lifetime, I count only John Elway and Joe Montana among them. As you will see later, Kurt Warner is an outlier on that list.

I initially started compiling this data in the summer of 2010 to show that the Vikings and Redskins were foolish to put their championship hopes in the hands of Brett Favre and Donovan McNabb, respectively. Their peaks were years ago. If you only took the last 12 years of Favre’s career, for instance, he doesn’t even get a glimpse of the Hall of Fame. His first 8 seasons were so great that they carried his reputations for a full two decades.

McNabb’s peak ended in 2005. The Eagles had a great run with him from 2000-2004, but he’s only won two playoff games since then. And what I remember most about that era is that the last meaningful play of every single Eagles season from 2001-2005 was an interception thrown by McNabb. Check it out:

• 2001-2002: McNabb interception on 4th down in NFC Championship Game in St. Louis.
  
• 2002-2003: McNabb interception returned for touchdown by Ronde Barber in NFC Championship Game
  
• 2003-2004: McNabb’s 3rd interception by Ricky Manning, Jr. in the NFC Championship Game
  
• 2004-2005: McNabb’s interception on by Rodney Harrison clinched the Super Bowl for New England
  
• 2005-2006: McNabb’s interception that Roy Williams returned for a touchdown on a Monday night (McNabb was injured on the play and missed the rest of the season)

Outside of Favre and McNabb, other quarterbacks do not maintain sustained periods of championship football. Look at Tom Brady. If he ever wins another Super Bowl as a starting quarterback, even if it happens this coming season, he will set two Super Bowl longevity records. First, he would break the record for the longest period of time between a quarterback’s first and last Super Bowl victories. It has been 10 years since the Patriots upset the Rams; the current record is Joe Montana’s 8-year gap between Super Bowls XVI and XXIV. Second, since it has been 7 years since the Patriots were champions, Brady would break Roger Staubach’s record of 6 seasons between consecutive Super Bowl victories. Only Terry Bradshaw, Joe Montana, Jim Plunkett, and Ben Roethlisberger have gone 3 seasons without winning a Super Bowl and went on to win another.

Furthermore, the record for consecutive Super Bowl appearances is only 8 years. The record for longest time between a quarterback’s first and last Super Bowl appearances is 12. Both of those records belong to Elway. Kurt Warner is in second place on both lists with 7 years and 9 years, respectively (Craig Morton is tied with Warner’s 7).
What this shows is that, for the most part, quarterbacks’ Super Bowl appearances come within a short time span. The stories of the old gunslinger leading his team on one last Super Bowl run are just a myth. It doesn’t happen in the NFL.

Now that that’s out of the way…




Last night, a quarterback discussion broke out on Twitter. Specifically, the names of Favre, McNabb, Brady, and Peyton Manning were thrown around. Thankfully, I had all of their data already compiled. The data I speak of is the playoff performance of all NFL quarterbacks who have started 10 or more playoff games since 1999, which is the year Donovan McNabb entered the league, Peyton Manning first made the playoffs, and Brett Favre really fell off. In total, this list includes the 4 quarterbacks already mentioned as well as Kurt Warner and Ben Roethlisberger. My initial premise was that McNabb and post-Holmgren Favre are the two worst playoff quarterbacks of this generation. I knew Peyton Manning wasn’t good, but I didn’t realize how close he was to Favre and McNabb. Manning’s actually been bad.

What you will see is the performance data broken up into different categories of playoff games since 1999: all games, games with a single-digit point differential, Championship Games/Super Bowls, wins, losses, games tied after 3 quarters, games led by 8 points or less after 3 quarters, games trailed by 8 points or less after 3 quarters, and overtime games. One interesting thing of which to take note is that Roethlisberger’s performances are all fairly consistent, no matter the category. His statistics are always OK, yet the Steelers always score a lot. Anyway…make your judgments for yourself. (Click here for the data)

ALL PLAYOFF GAMES SINCE 1999
The biggest surprise for me here was the realization that the Colts have scored as many as 20 points in only 9 of Peyton Manning’s 19 playoff games and that the Colts only averaged 22.37 points in those games. Next was realizing that only Kurt Warner averaged more than 2 touchdown passes per game.

By more than 4 points, Favre and McNabb have the 2 worst quarterback ratings of the group. Warner’s rating is a ridiculous 102.84.


SINGLE DIGIT PLAYOFF GAMES SINCE 1999
Before doing my research, I knew that Favre and McNabb’s teams had poor records in playoff games decided by less than 10 points. I knew that the only such game the Eagles won was the 4th & 26 game in which they defeated Favre’s Packers in overtime. Favre’s 1 win was the “and we’re gonna score” game in which Al Harris returned a Matt Hasselbeck interception for a touchdown in overtime. The Colts only scored 20 points in 3 of their 9 single-digit playoff games.

Oddly, even though each only posted a 1-3 record in such games, Favre and McNabb were the only 2 of the 6 to have a higher quarterback rating in single-digit games than in overall playoff games.


CHAMPIONSHIP GAMES & SUPER BOWLS SINCE 1999
It is here where Brady and Warner shine while Favre and McNabb fall far behind the others. By a lot, Favre and McNabb have the worst quarterback ratings of the bunch and Brady and Warner have the best. Only Warner and Brady managed to have more touchdown passes than interceptions in half of these games. No one else did it more than a third of the time. While Warner and Brady averaged 1 interception per game or less, Favre and McNabb were both at or near 2. That helps to explain why those Warner and Brady have a combined 11-4 record (1 game against each other) while the other two are 1-7 (no games played against each other). Manning and Roethlisberger also sport winning records in Championship Games and Super Bowls.

The most interesting statistic here is that Warner’s team averaged only 22.5 points in these games, yet still won 4 out of 6.


PLAYOFF LOSSES SINCE 1999
The first thing that struck me when looking at this data is that Roethlisberger’s Steelers have a higher scoring average in their losses than they do in their wins. Despite that, Roethlisberger throws 2.67 interceptions in each loss. Warner, amazingly, still has a respectable 88.47 quarterback rating in his losses.

Manning’s numbers are the most fascinating here, though. In his 10 playoff losses, he’s only thrown 9 touchdown passes. In 5 of those losses, however, he managed to throw more touchdown passes than interceptions. At 14.2 points per game, Manning has the worst scoring offense of those examined. Accordingly, they’ve only scored 20 points once in those losses.


PLAYOFF WINS SINCE 1999
When Brett Favre is good, he’s really good. In his 4 playoff wins, he posted a group best 123.25 quarterback rating. This is the only category in which Warner, who was second best with 109.96, did not have the best rating of the group. In those wins, Favre’s teams averaged 33.5 points per game and the quarterback had 10 TDs against only 1 INT and, naturally, had more touchdowns than interceptions in each game.

Peyton? In his 9 wins, he has 20 touchdowns and 9 interceptions. But I considered that he only threw for more touchdowns than interceptions in 5 of those 9 wins and looked deeper. If you eliminate the 2 games against Mike Shanahan’s defenseless Broncos, Manning has only 11 touchdowns and 8 interceptions in 7 wins. Those numbers are very un-Peyton like. In addition, he is the only quarterback of the 6 to average 1 interception per game.


PLAYOFF GAMES TIED AFTER 3 QUARTERS SINCE 1999
I wanted to take a look at how these guys performed in close, tense playoff games. Looking at games with a final margin of single digits can be misleading—sometimes teams score late and make a game appear closer than it really was. So I took a look at games that were within 1 score at the end of the 3rd quarter. In addition to noting who won and lost these games, I captured how many points the team scored, how many times they went ahead, fell behind, and either came back or had the other team come back against them.

As you’d expect, there weren’t too many games tied after 3 quarters. What is interesting is that McNabb’s Eagles lost their 1 tied game while Brady and Roethlisberger’s teams won all of theirs. Favre had 1 tie game; it went to overtime. It is worth nothing that Favre’s team fell behind in that 4th quarter and had to score a touchdown in order to send that game into overtime.


PLAYOFF GAMES WITH 1-POSSESSION LEAD AFTER 3 QUARTERS SINCE 1999
In looking at games that our quarterbacks’ teams led by 8 or less after 3, I saw that most of these guys were frontrunners. Brady, McNabb, Warner, and Roethlisberger all averaged scoring a touchdown or more in these 4th quarters. While averaging only 5.67 points in his 3 games, Warner fell behind twice and managed to come back to win both games. His record is 3-0.

Only Brady and Manning lost games in regulation. In fact, Brady’s team fell behind 3 times. The Pats won 1 of them. Manning’s case is the most interesting. Out of 8 games, the Colts only won 4. Hmm.


PLAYOFF GAMES WITH 1-POSSESSION DEFECIT AFTER 3 QUARTERS SINCE 1999
In the opposite type games, again we find that only Brady and Manning have won in regulation. Each of the others brought one of these games into overtime. Manning and McNabb have both given their teams the lead only to wind up losing in the end. Each of these guys outside of Warner, who was never in the situation, averaged more than a touchdown per game.


OVERTIME PLAYOFF GAMES SINCE 1999
I knew this going in, but I am amazed that every single one of Brett Favre’s playoff games since 1999 that has ended with a single-digit margin has gone into overtime. It says a lot that, while his team is 1-3 in those overtime games, a Favre interception has played a role in every single one of those losses (overtime interceptions against the Eagles and Giants as well as the interception that sent the Saints loss to overtime). It is absolutely hilarious that the only single-digit victory Favre has was via a defensive score. Similarly, McNabb’s only close playoff victory was an overtime victory that was assisted by a Favre interception in overtime.

Peyton Manning cannot at all be blamed for his 0-2 overtime record. One loss was to San Diego; Indianapolis never saw the ball in overtime. In 2000, the Colts lost in overtime in Miami. Manning drove the offense to what should have been the winning score, but Mike Vanderjagt missed a field goal.

We've Seen This Before

Somebody explain to me why the Packers are favored in Soldier Field on Sunday. Somebody explain to me why people think the Packers are going to the Super Bowl. Somebody explain to me why people think the Packers can win this game.

Green Bay is currently a 3.5-point favorite over Chicago. We’ve seen this before. Seven years ago, the visiting Colts entered the AFC Championship Game with all the experts expecting them to defeat the Patriots. The next season, the Colts were actually favored in the divisional round on the road at New England. The Patriots won both games easily. When those two teams played in the 2003 and 2004 regular seasons, we saw nothing to suggest that Indianapolis could beat the Patriots in a game that mattered, especially in Foxboro.

This year, we have seen the Packers and Bears play each other twice. Nothing in those two games told me the Packers can win this game on Sunday. Like the Colts before them, the Packers have tricked the public into thinking they were an offensive juggernaut that can’t be stopped. Well, Chicago did a pretty good job twice this season. In Week 17, the two played in Lambeau Field in a game the Packers needed. That game meant absolutely nothing to the Bears. Green Bay barely squeaked that one out.

It’s not just that, though. Watching the games, it is clear to me that the Packers have trouble with their red zone offense against the Bears. They may get an occasional touchdown, but field goals are their game against Chicago.

I just don’t think they have it in them to win a playoff game in Chicago this year. I don’t see it happening. Give me the home dog.

It's Not the Bye, It's the Team

Every year, when one, two, or three of the road teams wins in the Divisional Round of the NFL playoffs, there is talk that earning a bye isn’t all it’s cracked up to be, that he bye does more to hurt a team’s momentum entering the playoffs than it does to give them an advantage. This is nonsense. Complete and utter nonsense. The bye is not the problem. In most cases, the home team that loses coming off a bye is a team that probably should not have earned a bye. The problem is the schedule. Let me show you:

Here is the relevant statistic regarding teams earning playoff byes: from 1990, when the 12-team playoff format was introduced, to 2001, home teams (bye teams) in the divisional round were 39-9. Since 2002, such teams are only 22-14.

When the Houston Texans entered the league in 2002, the NFL altered its scheduling formula. Prior to 2002, when there were three divisions in each conference, a team’s place in a season’s final standings affected four of the next season’s games. Since 2002, one season’s finish only affects two of the following season’s games. A two game difference may seem small, but it is actually a rather drastic change to go from having a team’s finish affect 25% of the schedule to only affecting 12.5% of it.

The current setup of four divisions in each conference means that the majority of teams play fewer division games each season than they did under the old format. During the 28-team era (1976-1994, the AFC Central and NFC West each had only four teams. Each team in those divisions played only six division games each season. The other 20 teams in the NFL played 8 division games each year. When Carolina and Jacksonville joined the league in 1995, each of the NFL’s six divisions had five teams. From 1995-2001, every team in the league played 8 division games a year. That’s half of the schedule.

When you add the division games to the games affected by the standings, that is 75% of a teams’s schedule. The remaining four games were inter-conference games. Then, as now, each NFC division played four games against an AFC division.

To be more specific about it, every single one of a team’s intra-conference nondivision games were determined by the standings. A first place team in the NFC East, for instance, would play 8 division games, 4 games against AFC team, and a single game against each of the first and second place teams from the NFC West and NFC Central. A fourth place team in the AFC West would play its 8 intra-division games, 4 inter-conference games, and single games against the third and fourth place teams from the AFC East and AFC Central. In addition, the fifth place teams would play a true last place schedule.

The current format is drastically different. The biggest difference from the old format is that each team plays two entire divisions: one from its own conference and one from the other conference. With four teams in each division, there are only six division games on each team’s schedule. There are still the four inter-conference games. After adding the four intra-conference games against an entire division, that leaves only two remaining games on the schedule. These two games are determined by the standings. Each team plays each of the teams in its own conference that finished with a like standing in the other divisions. In 2011, for example, the third place team from the NFC East, the Dallas Cowboys, will play the entire NFC West as well as the Lions and Buccaneers, the third place teams from the NFC North and the NFC South, respectively.

It is my contention that this change in scheduling format leads to inflated records, deflated records, and teams earning byes when they aren’t quite as good as teams that play in the Wild Card round. When one division is unusually strong or unusually weak, the divisions they play face schedules that are overly easy or difficult. Teams that finish in first place no longer face a true, daunting first place schedule; teams that finish in the basement don’t face an easier path the following year. Schedule difficulty now is all dependent upon the cycle of which divisions a team plays in a given year.

In 2011, Tampa Bay will be a better team than they were in 2010, but they may not post as good a record. At 10-6, the Bucs were third in the NFC South this year. Under the old format, they would play the third and fourth place teams from the NFC’s other divisions. Instead, they will play the NFC North as well as the Cowboys and 49ers, the third place teams from the NFC East and NFC West, respectively. By playing the entire NFC North, the Bucs will play Green Bay and Chicago instead of Washington and Minnesota.

At the same time, the NFC East will play the NFC West, so unless the league’s weakest division improves drastically over the offseason, the Eagles and Giants, who placed first and second in the NFC East this year, will have the advantage of playing the Cardinals and 49ers. The previous format would have pitted the Eagles against the Packers and Saints instead; the Giants would have played the Bears and Falcons instead.

Occasionally, one division is fortunate enough to play the both conferences’ weakest division. The most egregious example of this was 2008, a year the AFC East teams faced the AFC West and NFC West. Those were, essentially, eight “gimme” games for the Patriots, Jets, and Dolphins (the Bills were too awful to beat anybody). A lot of people were up in arms that season because the 11-5 Patriots missed the playoffs while the 8-8Chargers, 9-7 Cardinals, and 9-6-1 Eagles made it. There was no injustice that year. The Patriots finished second in the AFC East to Miami, who also finished 11-5. Both the Patriots and Dolphins won seven of their eight games against the AFC West and NFC West. Both teams went 4-4 against the remainder of their schedules. Both teams swept the season series with Buffalo. Against the AFC West, NFC West, and Buffalo Bills, both Miami and New England went 9-1. Both finished 2-4 against everyone else. New England, who won the division in 2007, played their intra-conference nondivision games against Pittsburgh and Indianapolis. They lost both games. Miami finished last in 2007 and played Baltimore and Houston. They lost both of those games. As you can see, 11-5 was a highly inflated record for both Miami and New England.

My point is that the new scheduling formula makes it so that you can no longer look at a team’s record as a fair indicator of how good that team is. So it follows that a team earning a first round playoff bye should no longer be an indicator of that team’s superiority. Until the format is changed, those days are over.

Peyton's Problem

I don’t remember which two teams were playing, but I do remember something Bob Davie said about them during ESPN’s broadcast of the game. Davie said, “Both of these teams are so well prepared for this game that the offenses are successful because they are doing things they haven’t done all year.” At the time I thought it was the second stupidest thing I would ever hear a sportscaster say—I hope nothing ever surpasses George Foreman telling an HBO audience that Floyd Mayweather, Jr. should celebrate his grandmother passing out in the ring after a fight. When thinking about Peyton Manning’s postseason career, though, I can apply Davie’s stupid statement.

Peyton Manning is a studier. He knows your tendencies. He knows your strengths, your weaknesses, your likes, your dislikes. He has seen every play you have run in every situation. If you have ever done it, Peyton Manning has seen you do it. And he prepares accordingly. In addition to all of his physical talent, that study time is a huge reason for all the success Manning has had in the game of football.

Yet, since he entered the NFL, Peyton Manning’s teams are only 9-10 in the postseason. And for all the talk about how the Colts have rarely, if ever, had a good defense during the Manning era, Peyton’s Colts teams only average 22.37 points per postseason game (that average drops to 19.71 if you take out the two games against the Jake Plummer era Broncos). That is not championship quality offense.

People also talk about the inability of dome teams to perform outdoors in cold weather. But Manning’s Colts are only 6-4 at home in playoff games. Again removing those two games against the Broncos, the record drops to 4-4 with a 23.13 points per game average. Furthermore, with Manning at quarterback, the Colts have lost their first playoff game 7 times in 11 postseasons. 4 of those 7 losses were in Indianapolis. And only once in 4 tries have Manning’s Colts won a playoff game coming off a bye.

In only one of Manning’s four home playoff losses has the Colt defense allowed more than 21 points. Only 4 times in the 10 overall postseason losses has the other team topped 21 points during regulation. So while the defense hasn’t been great, it has not allowed a lot of points. No, when the Colts lose in the postseason, it is almost always because the offense comes up short.

How and why does this happen? To get the answer, I think you have to go back to his days at Tennessee.

During Manning’s years at Tennessee, the Volunteers and Florida Gators were the only contenders in the SEC. That allowed Bob Stoops, the Florida defensive coordinator during Manning’s junior and senior seasons, to prepare special defenses only to be used against the Vols. Going back to what I said at the beginning, Peyton Manning lined up to face a Florida Gators defense that did things he had never seen before. I’ll never forget the 1996 game. It was in Knoxville, and a lot of us thought it would finally be the year Tennessee beat Spurrier’s Florida team. But Peyton threw four interceptions in the first half, and it was all over. In 1997, a not-quite championship level Florida team gave Tennessee their only regular season loss. Again, Peyton threw multiple picks.

This is what happens in the NFL playoffs. Defensive coordinators must, must, must come up with new things for playoff games against the Colts. All the studying in the world doesn’t help Peyton Manning play against new defenses. Teams cannot devote the necessary time for newness during the regular season. In the postseason, when it’s do or die, they do it. This is why the Colts always struggle scoring postseason points.

Peyton Manning does not adjust quickly to new defenses. He needs time to study, think, and plot. There have plenty of jokes over the years about Manning being a robot, but he is computer like in a way. He does not improvise. He can only process the information that is given to him. When you present him with something he’s never processed before, he cannot compute.

Peyton Manning is the kid who shows up to the test, sees a problem he can’t figure out, and says, “This wasn’t in the text.”

Jesus Wasn't Silent When He Turned the Other Cheek

Anyone who knows me knows that I have plenty of issues with Donovan McNabb as a football player. I also have a variety of issues with him as a person. I have never met the man, but I saw enough during his eleven years in Philadelphia to know what I know.

My biggest issues with McNabb are those things that lead other people to call him classy. I find a great many of his “classy” actions to be passive aggressive, dishonest, and disrespectful. Yesterday, after he was benched in favor of Rex Grossman during the final two minutes of Washington’s 37-25 loss in Detroit, McNabb provided a perfect example of what I find so disturbing about him.

He always does his very best to avoid causing controversy. Donovan McNabb does not want to be seen as a troublemaker. As a result, the man never stands up for himself. It happened in Philadelphia, and now it’s happening in Washington.

If my child responded to disrespect in the manner that Donovan McNabb consistently does, I would be ashamed of him/her. Every time one of these situations pops up, I think about the song, You Gotta Be by Des’ree. The opening stanza is:

Listen as your day unfolds
Challenge what the future holds
Try and keep your head up to the sky
Lovers, they may cause you tears
Go ahead release your fears
Stand up and be counted
Don't be ashamed to cry

This is what McNabb never does. McNabb always publicly makes light of the situation and refuses to challenge the coaches. I will not go so far as to call McNabb a yes man, but he most definitely is a company man. An effective team leader cannot be a company man. It absolutely cannot work. This is why many of the defensive players never fully backed McNabb during his days as the Eagles’ quarterback. This also cost him the full support of the offensive players during his final two years in Philadelphia. In November 2008, he was benched in the second half of a game in Baltimore. He reacted the same way, and from that point on, the skill position players were Kevin Kolb guys. McNabb never publicly admits to being angry or feeling disrespected until he is already removed from the situation. This is not classy. This is prey behavior. He speaks and behaves like a victim; this is the furthest thing from leadership.

People call McNabb classy and a nice guy, but I don’t see it that way. It is never right to allow others to disrespect you. When you allow other people to disrespect you, you are admitting to the world that you are not worthy of respect. Due to their circumstances, some people feel as if they must grin and bear it. McNabb should not feel that need. He is an NFL quarterback who people generally like. But, no, he never commands respect from anyone perceived to be at or above his level. Sure, he can criticize Terrell Owens, but he can never stand up to Andy Reid or Mike Shanahan until they are no longer his coach. It’s weak. It’s the way of a victim.

People say they respect McNabb for turning the other cheek. The thought I cannot escape is this: Jesus wasn’t silent when He turned the other cheek. You should never act as if it is fine when people disrespect you. You should never allow people to act disrespectfully toward anyone and then act as if they are not doing so. Allowing disrespect to go unacknowledged is living a lie. Every time McNabb allows this to happen to him, he perpetuates the problem.

And this affects more than him. Think about this: if Donovan McNabb can’t stand up for himself, what Black quarterback can? Because of his stature and accomplishments, McNabb is viewed, more or less, as the standard bearer for Black quarterbacks. If he refuses to stand up for himself, then other Black quarterbacks must follow suit. If he were to speak up and not allow others to publicly disrespect him, the media would grow more comfortable with other Black quarterbacks doing it too. Remember when Vince Young had his episode? People remember that it occurred after Young was benched in favor of Kerry Collins. What is never mentioned anymore is that Young was widely criticized in the media for speaking about how upset and disappointed he was for being benched.

Meanwhile, Aaron Rodgers and Kevin Kolb are praised for their desire to play when they expressed their anger and impatience at having to sit behind Brett Favre and McNabb, respectively. Vince Young was not afforded that same praise. Some of that is attributable to McNabb’s refusal to stand up for himself.

You act like a victim, you become a victim.

Andy Reid's Offensive Line

On September 23, I read Paul Domowitch’s column in The Philadelphia Daily News. (Link to column) "Offensive line is real reason why Eagles picked Michael Vick over Kolb” is the headline above the column. While I do not fully buy into Domo’s theory, I do believe the offensive line played a major part in Andy Reid’s decision to start Vick over Kevin Kolb. The sieve of the Eagles’ offensive line is largely responsible for Kolb’s concussion on Opening Day, and Vick has the mobility to elude a great deal of the pressure Eagle quarterbacks will face for the rest of this season.

If I was head coach of the Eagles, I would have announced Vick as the four-week starter at quarterback. I would have given Kolb a month to recover from his concussion and brought him back to start on October 17 against the Falcons. As it is, Reid has decided to start Vick for the rest of the season. Whatever role the offensive line played into his decision, Andy Reid is responsible for the wreck that unit has become. As the coach himself often says, this one’s on him.

Early in Reid’s tenure with the Eagles, the offensive line was a strength. The line has been in steady decline ever since. Isn’t this ironic? People often refer to the fact that Reid’s job immediately prior to becoming head coach of the Eagles was as the quarterback coach of the Green Bay Packers. They don’t realize that he only spent one season in that role. Prior to that, he worked exclusively on the offensive line. Andy Reid played offensive tackle and guard at Brigham Young. From 1983 through 1991, Reid was an offensive line coach at four different colleges. He then went on to become an offensive assistant and then offensive line coach for the Packers. In 1997, Reid was employed as the team’s tight ends coach. It was not until 1998 that Reid served under Mike Holmgren as Brett Favre’s quarterback coach. The man spent over twenty years working exclusively on offensive lines; one would think he understood the unit’s importance to a football team.

Let’s look at the how the Eagles’ poor offensive line of 2010 came to be:

For nearly a full decade, the Eagles had possibly the best pair of tackles in the National Football League. Tra Thomas, Ray Rhodes’ final first round draft pick, started at left tackle in Philly for eleven years before the Eagles let him leave as a free agent after the 2008 season. Jon Runyan arrived in 2000 as a free agent from Tennessee and started at right tackle in every game the Eagles played from the day he showed up through the 2008 postseason, when the Eagles allowed him to leave via free agency. When their Eagle careers ended, Thomas and Runyan were 34 and 35, respectively. Amazingly, despite knowing both tackles’ contracts ended after 2008 and that their ages would keep the Eagles from trying to retain either of them, the team had no solid plan for replacing the bookends of the offensive line.

In 2009, the Eagles allowed 38 sacks. That was only the third time the Eagles gave up that many sacks since 2003. The other two years were 2005 and 2007. 2005 was the year the Eagles suffered from Super Bowl hangover and finished in last place in the NFC East. 2007 was a different story. Tra Thomas missed the September 30 game against the Giants due to injury. The team’s second-round draft pick from 2006, Winston Justice, made his first NFL start that night. Not so coincidentally, the Eagles allowed twelve sacks that night. Osi Umenyiora, whom Justice spent most of the night attempting to block, was credited with six of them. Winston Justice started every game at right tackle for the 2009 Eagles.

How did Justice come to be the Eagles’ starting right tackle last season? Oh, boy, what a mess. Like most messes, this story is not a simple one, and it revolves around uncertainty. It starts on April 24, 2004, the first day of the NFL Draft. In the first round, the Eagles traded up from the 28th pick to the 16th pick. At the time of the trade, everybody knew the Eagles made the trade so they could draft Steven Jackson, the running back from Oregon State. Instead, Andy Reid surprised the entire football world by selecting Shawn Andrews, an All-American tackle from Arkansas. Because Thomas and Runyan were on the team, Reid envisioned Andrews as a guard. Although a broken leg cost him the final fifteen games of his rookie season, Andrews quickly became the best guard in the league.

In 2008, it became apparent that Shawn Andrews was falling apart. In June of that year, he abruptly left the team for “personal issues.” He did not show up to training camp the next month. On August 4, The Philadelphia Daily News published an article in which Andrews spoke about dealing with depression. Six days later, he showed up at training camp. Andrews started playing again and began the 2008 regular season starting at right guard for the Eagles. In the second game of that season, Andrews left with a herniated disc. The Eagles didn’t expect him to miss the rest of the season, but he did. About six weeks after initially sustaining the injury, Andrews went under the knife.

With his physical problems supposedly corrected, Andrews was expected to return to the Eagles starting lineup in 2009. Andy Reid was still worried about the depression, so he sought to do what he could to make sure the Eagles became the ideal atmosphere for his Pro Bowl right guard. In late February 2009, the Eagles signed Stacy Andrews, Shawn’s older brother, to a six-year, $38.9 million contract. Stacy Andrews was a fourth round pick of the Bengals in the same year in which the Eagles drafted Shawn. Stacy had been Cincinnati’s starting right tackle in 2007 and 2008. It would have been reasonable to assume that Stacy would take on that role for the Eagles and replace Jon Runyan in 2009 except that he had torn his anterior cruciate ligament in his second-to-last game as a Bengal. As a preemptive move, Andy Reid switched the Andrews brothers’ positions; Shawn became the starting right tackle and Stacy was named the starter at right guard. It was a move to guard against the limited mobility Stacy would probably experience coming off the torn knee ligament. Still, the Eagles expected Stacy Andrews to be healthy enough to start the 2009 season (familiarize yourself with this concept). As it turned out, Andrews was neither healthy enough nor pass blocking well enough to warrant playing time. Stacy was benched after the season opener and only started one other game the rest of the season. In order to avoid being cut, he accepted a reduced salary in March 2010. He was then traded to Seattle for an undisclosed 2011 draft pick. Max Jean-Gilles and Nick Cole started the other fourteen games at right guard.

Reid’s creation of a comfortable environment for Shawn Andrews did not end with the signing of the player’s brother. A week before the 2009 draft, the Eagles traded their first and sixth round picks for Jason Peters, Shawn’s college roommate. Peters had gone undrafted in 2004, but had worked his way onto the Buffalo Bills’ roster and had been selected to the Pro Bowl following both the 2007 and 2008 seasons. Peters had been involved in a contract dispute with the Bills for a year, which is why he was available. After the trade, the Eagles signed him to a six year, $60 million deal. Although he was selected to three consecutive Pro Bowls—he was voted as the NFC’s starting left tackle after his first season as an Eagle—Peters’ play has been inconsistent since he became a starter in the league. In 2008, Peters led the league by allowing 11.5 sacks, despite playing only thirteen games. In Peters’ first year as an Eagle, he was rated the worst starting left tackle in the NFL by Football Outsiders. I don’t think you’d find many Eagle fans who would disagree with that assessment. Peters started every game at left tackle for the Eagles in 2009. He is still the starter at that position.

As poorly as Reid’s acquisitions of Shawn Andrews’ brother and college roommate turned out, Shawn’s situation ended up worse. His back never felt good enough to allow him onto the football field in 2009. The Eagles released him in March 2010. Since Shawn was unable to play, Winston Justice was the Eagles’ starting right tackle throughout the entire 2009 season.

Todd Herremans was slated to start at left tackle in 2009. He missed the season’s first five games due to a stress fracture. When he returned, he started at that position. Nick Cole started at left guard during Herremans’ absence. When Herremans was healthy enough to play, Cole took over at right guard for Max Jean-Gilles, who is more of a run blocker than a pass blocker.

Until tearing his ACL in the fifteenth game of the season, Jamaal Jackson started at center. Although he was never drafted, Jackson is a very good NFL center. In my opinion, he is one of the top three or four centers in the NFC. The problem is that Andy Reid and the Eagles have never acquired a legitimate center to back up Jackson. After Jackson injured his knee, Nick Cole took over as starting center in the final game of the regular season and the wild card game. Both of those games were road games against the Cowboys. The Cowboys recorded four sacks in each of those games. The Eagles weren’t able to run the ball in either contest. Jay Ratliff, the Cowboy nose tackle who always abuses the Eagles, looked like Joe Greene against Nick Cole. The poor offensive line play was the primary reason the Eagles managed to score only fourteen points combined in the two games.

Actually, the offensive line was responsible for a lot that went bad for the Eagles last season. I already explained how the players on the line were put together. Let me now look at them as a unit. The Eagles’ 2009 starting offensive lines broke down like this (from left tackle to right tackle):

Jason Peters, Nick Cole, Jamaal Jackson, Stacy Andrews, Winston Justice – 1 game (Game 1)
Jason Peters, Nick Cole, Jamaal Jackson, Max Jean-Gilles, Winston Justice – 4 games (Game 2-5)
Jason Peters, Todd Herremans, Jamaal Jackson, Nick Cole, Winston Justice – 9 games (Games 6-8, 10-15)
Todd Herremans, Nick Cole, Jamaal Jackson, Stacy Andrews, Winston Justice – 1 game (Game 9)
Jason Peters, Todd Herremans, Nick Cole, Max Jean-Gilles, Winston Justice – 2 games (Game 17, Wild Card Playoff)

Including the playoff game against Dallas, the Eagles had 85 starts on the offensive line. 17 of those starts were made by a player drafted in the second round. 20 starts were made by players drafted in the fourth round. The remaining 48 starts were recorded by players who were not drafted. Granted, two of the three undrafted players who started on the offensive line were Jason Peters and Jamaal Jackson, who have played at a very high level in the NFL. But Peters has severely regressed since having an excellent year in 2007. The other undrafted starter was Nick Cole, who is serviceable. Cole is mediocre, at best. The second round pick is Justice. While Justice is not as bad as he was in that infamous start against the Giants, he is another mediocre, at best, lineman. True, the Eagles expected Shawn Andrews to start; he would have been the only first round pick on the line. So the line the Eagles put together included one first rounder, a bad second rounder, and a bunch of fourth rounders and undrafted free agents.

How does Andy Reid expect to have a credible offensive line when he’s building the unit with players no one expected to be good? The success of the Eagles’ offensive line is based on getting lucky with unheralded players. That is no way to plan for winning. While it is true that drafting is an inexact science, players are drafted in the first and second round for a reason. Andy Reid does not seem to understand this. If he did, he would have learned from the mistake of 2009 and built a better offensive line for 2010.

In the offseason, the Eagles did not sign any offensive linemen who were projected to make the two-deep depth chart. They went into the draft with thirteen picks—they drafted zero offensive linemen. Think about this: the offensive line was a disaster last season, especially in the final two games against the rival Dallas Cowboys, yet the Eagles did not add a single offensive lineman.

Furthermore, although Jackson tore his ACL two days after Christmas 2009, the Eagles expected him to be fully recovered by the start of the 2010 season; therefore, they signed no true backup center. Unlike Stacy Andrews the year before, Jackson actually was healthy enough to play at the start of this season. Unfortunately, he tore his right biceps in the season opener against Green Bay and will miss the rest of the season. This time, Mike McGlynn, a fourth round pick in the 2008 draft who played tackle in college, took over Jackson’s starting center spot.

I understand that teams can’t really afford to sign backups who only play center. At the same time, I think it behooves every team to have at least one reserve offensive lineman who has played center before. Two seasons in a row, the Eagles have cost themselves by not having a credible center to take over after Jamaal Jackson was injured.

The offensive line in general is just terrible. Barring more injuries, the Eagles’ starting offensive line for the rest of the season will be (from left tackle to right tackle) Jason Peters, Todd Herremans, Mike McGlynn, Nick Cole, and Winston Justice. Awful. Through three games this year, they have already allowed fourteen sacks—who knows how many sacks they would have given up if not for Vick’s superior mobility—despite playing two of those games against Detroit and Jacksonville (by contrast, the Eagles three opponents this year have recorded a total of twelve sacks in their five other games). This line was a problem last year and the Eagles have done absolutely nothing to make it better this year.

This also explains how and why this is the second year in a row that the Eagles’ starting quarterback suffered an injury in the opening game. Yes, McNabb suffered in injury in 2009 Week 1 that forced him to not play in Weeks 2 and 3. Kevin Kolb was concussed in Week 1 this season and missed Week 2 due to that injury.

If we’ve learned nothing since 1999, it is that Andy Reid does not learn well. This offensive line does not seem likely to improve in 2011. Very strange for a team coached by a man who has spent the majority of his life on the offensive line.

Reid Wrong for Vick

I know there are a lot of people out there who believe Andy Reid made the right call in electing to start Michael Vick over Kevin Kolb for the foreseeable future. There are a seemingly equal number of people who believe Reid is making a huge mistake. I am about ninety percent into the latter camp. I think the coach made the wrong decision, but I don’t think it matters much. No matter the quarterback, I fully believe the Eagles are incapable of winning the Super Bowl as long as Andy Reid makes the team’s football decisions.

Those who believe Vick should be the starter do so for the following reasons: based on his track record as quarterback of the Falcons, Michael Vick is a winner in the NFL; Vick has played spectacularly through six quarters this season while Kolb had a pretty bad beginning to his 2010 season; the Eagles’ offensive line is awful, especially injury replacement center Mike McGlynn, and Kolb’s limited mobility will get him hurt again; Vick gives the Eagles the best chance to win ten or eleven games this year and make the playoffs; and, frankly, Kolb has not shown anything to forcefully prove that he should have been starting over Vick anyway. I cannot disagree with any of those reasons; they are all one hundred percent correct. Still, I believe Kevin Kolb should be the Eagles’ starting quarterback.

The Kolb supporters tend to subscribe the following: after three years of grooming Kolb and five months of propping him up as the starter, two quarters is not enough time to determine that he’s not the right guy for the job; Kolb shouldn’t lose his starting job because of an injury; Kolb is much better suited to run Reid’s West Coast Offense than Vick; Kolb played good-to-great in his two starts last season, so Reid should have more confidence in him; and it undermines Kolb’s standing with his teammates for him to lose his starting job so soon. I cannot disagree with either of these arguments either.

What the people in both camps are neglecting to do is take the coach into consideration. We have seen Andy Reid for eleven years; we know him by now. From what we know of Reid, Kolb should be the guy. Let me count the ways:

1. Michael Vick is 30 years old. Anyone who’s followed the Eagles during Jeffrey Lurie’s ownership tenure knows that this organization does not like signing or extending players in their thirties. Some might think the quarterback position would be immune to this, but the Eagles have not yet shown this to be true. The Eagles drafted Kolb just as McNabb turned 30. At the time, the effective portion of McNabb’s contract was set to run out after the 2009 season, when he would be 33. Due to their organizational philosophy, Eagles can see Michael Vick as nothing but a short-term fix. This was not a move for beyond 2010.
   
2. The Eagles have wanted Kevin Kolb to be the starting quarterback since November 2008. I will always believe that when Andy Reid benched McNabb for Kolb at halftime of the Eagles’ 2008 game in Baltimore, he anticipated never playing McNabb again. Had Kolb led a second half comeback victory, that most certainly would have been the case. The Eagles last that game, however, and Kolb’s most infamous highlight was throwing a pass that Ed Reed turned into the longest interception return in NFL history. Still, I think Reid was ready to make a permanent move to Kolb. Unfortunately for the young quarterback, the Eagles had a short week because of a game Thanksgiving night. It would have been an unfair and impossible situation to put a guy in the position of starting his first NFL game without a week of practice preceding it. In that Thanksgiving game, McNabb went out and had one of his three best games since the Super Bowl year of 2004. Then, the Eagles went to the NFC Championship Game. Losing in the previous round may have made Kolb the starting quarterback in 2009.
   
3. Michael Vick is not the type of quarterback you want Andy Reid to trust. People in Philadelphia have often remarked that Reid called a more balanced offense when McNabb was out due to injury. I think this is because Reid did not trust the backup quarterbacks the way he did McNabb. He trusted McNabb. When that trusted quarterback played, Reid called fewer running plays than any other coach in the league. If Vick gains Reid’s trust as the starter, Reid will be inclined to revert back to his throw throw throw days. While you do not want any quarterback to play in that type of system, but I cannot think of a one less suited to play that style than Michael Vick.
   
4. The decision to start Vick effectively breaks the bond that Kolb had established with the Eagles’ young core of offensive players. In this regard, Kolb had succeeded with the Eagles’ recently drafted skill position players in a way that Donovan McNabb had not. Although McNabb put up decent numbers throwing to DeSean Jackson, Jeremy Maclin, and Brent Celek and handing the ball off to LeSean McCoy, they were actually Kevin Kolb’s guys. They bonded with him and believed in him. More so than McNabb, Kolb had the confidence of the team’s young nucleus. The move to start Vick, especially since Andy Reid said that Kolb’s injury had nothing to do with the switch, undermines that. Kolb and the rest of the young guys had been looking forward to this as their time. They were coming up together. Now those guys play for Vick. Who is Kolb? What is his role? In his press conference this morning, Reid said that he cannot predict if Kolb will still be on the Eagles’ roster after next month’s trading deadline. That tells the team, especially the skill players with whom he had bonded, that the team does not believe Kolb is ready. What reason do those guys have to believe it now?

Michael Vick gives the Eagles the best chance to win the NFC East this year, but what about 2011 and beyond? The Cowboys were the only team in the division to beat the Eagles last year, but they are now 0-2. Nobody in Philadelphia believes that McNabb’s Redskins are a threat. The Giants looked like a mess Sunday night and their offense looks to be in shambles. The division is there for the taking. Going with Kolb means growing pains. While I believe the Eagles are a 2010 playoff team with Kolb as the full-time starter, not many in the city or organization agree. The general consensus is that they would be a better team in December than in September and October. Vick is more experienced, more seasoned, and has proven that he can win playoff games with under-talented teams. I just don’t believe this is a smart approach to the development of the football team.

Naming Vick the starting quarterback is all about right now. The only outcome that can justify this move is the Eagles winning the Super Bowl this coming February in Arlington. At the very least, they need to play in that game. I don’t think this is a Super Bowl caliber team, though. It would be one thing if Vick became the Eagles’ long-term starting quarterback, but I’d be very surprised if we see him wearing midnight green on Opening Day 2011.

This reminds me very much of the mistake the Packers made by allowing Brett Favre to come back in 2007. Yes, Green Bay reached the NFC Championship Game that season, but they neither won nor reached the Super Bowl. In the end, the only thing that was accomplished that season was delaying Aaron Rodgers’ development by one year. 2007 could have been that year of transition, 2008 could have been about getting a taste of the playoffs, and 2009 could have been a Super Bowl year. If the Eagles really do keep Kolb and intend to start him in the future, this year of starting Michael Vick will only delay Kolb’s development and waste a year of Jackson, Maclin, Celek, and McCoy’s careers.

Trading Kolb would be a bad move, too. It would be akin to starting over one year after…starting over. If Reid and the rest of the Eagles hierarchy did not fully believe in Kevin Kolb, they should have drafted another quarterback high this year’s draft. They could have even acquired Jason Campbell in the Donovan McNabb trade. They could have done something. Vick is not their answer. He’s too old for their eyes. We know this.

For the 2010 Philadelphia Eagles, it is Super Bowl or bust. I think it’s going bust.

If I was an Eagle fan, I’d be very upset today. This is a sign that the Eagles organization, once again, is settling for merely competing.